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NEW RULINGS THREATEN THE
DERIVATIVE SUIT-WILL THE
"NEEDED POLICEMAN" KEEP
WALKING THE BEAT?
DANIEL J. MORRISSEY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In both legal form and economic reality, shareholders of
publicly-held corporations have for some time lacked any real
control over the entities which, in theory, they own.' As a consequence, these shareholders have needed a device to enforce the
* Associate Professor, University of Tulsa. A.B., Georgetown University, 1971; J.D.,
Georgetown University, 1974.
The author gratefully acknowledges his debt to Professor Marc I. Steinberg of the
University of Maryland for a conversation which provoked this Article and to law student Bruce Almquist for his assistance in its preparation.
1. Under a traditional concept of corporate law, holders of common stock own the
basic entrepreneurial interests in a corporation. They may vote to elect directors, are
entitled proportionately to such dividends as are distributed, and receive proportionately
the net assets after payment of all creditors' claims in the event of liquidation. H. HENN
& J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 160 (3d ed. 1983); 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5086 (rev. perm. ed. 1980). These rights are
typically set forth in the corporation's certificate of incorporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1983). In large, publicly-held corporations, however, where no one
shareholder owns a significant portion of the company's stock, it has long been recognized that management is an endocratic body. As was aptly observed over 50 years ago:
"Under such conditions control may be held by the directors or titular managers who can
employ the proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body, even though as a group
they own but a small fraction of the stock outstanding." A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 5 (1933).
A leading text on corporate finance explains the position of shareholders in the corporate structure:
As receivers of residual income, holders of common stock are frequently
referred to as the ultimate entrepreneurs in the firm. They are the ultimate
owners, and they have the ultimate control. Presumably, the firm is managed
on behalf of the holders of common stock, but there has been much dispute
about the actual situation.
J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 755 (7th ed. 1981). For a contemporary
discussion of how the separation of corporate ownership from corporate control promoted the emergence of the profession of management in America, see R. REICH, THE
NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 60-82 (1983).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

1

632

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

rights of their corporations when confronted with unfaithful
stewardship by their putative managing representatives, the directors.2 To afford stockholders such a tool, courts in equity created a legal oddity, the derivative suit, which actually consists of
two separate causes of action.3 First, shareholders must sue the
corporation for refusing to pursue its rights. They may then assert the corporation's claim on its behalf against the wrongdoer.4

2. Management of a corporation is legally vested in the board of directors. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)(1983). For a troubling report on techniques now in use by
management to enrich themselves at the expense of the corporation, see Crittenden, The
Age of "Me-First"Management, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, § 3, at 1, col. 1. Crittenden
describes such current abuses of corporate power as payments of disproportionate salaries and bonuses, buy-outs of potential tender-offerors (so-called "greenmail"), and lucrative severance arrangements known colloquially as "golden parachutes." One former
top corporate official has recently asserted that the contemporary structure and operating practice of boards of directors make it virtually impossible for directors to exercise
any meaningful supervisory authority over company officers. Geneen, Why Directors
Can't Protect the Shareholders,FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 1984, at 28. However, another commentator has argued that the problem of effective corporate oversight is an organizational one, inherent in the structure of all large associations in modern society. Kristol,
Dilemma of the Outside Director, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1984, § 1, at 36, col. 3.
3. See Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U, L. REv. 980 (1957) for a discussion of the 19th century English and American
origins of this action. Although several early American cases recognize the rights of
shareholders to redress wrongs to their corporations, Prunty argues that the derivative
suit originated in an English case, Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.
1843).
Three other remedies available to shareholders seeking to hold management accountable for its actions are summarized in Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. Rnv.
261, 264-65 (1981). For that purpose, the authors find that direct shareholder suits, the
proxy mechanism, and tender offers are relatively ineffective and inferior to derivative
actions.
4. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). In Ross the Supreme Court extended the
right of trial by jury to shareholders in a derivative suit when the underlying claim, had
it been asserted by the corporation, would have been tried by a jury. Id. at 542. Shareholders who suffer direct injuries may sue the wrongdoer to enforce their own rights. A
decline in stock value resulting from an injury to the corporation, however, can not form
the basis of an individual shareholder action. See Note, DistinguishingBetween Direct
and Derivative ShareholderSuits, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1962) for a discussion of the
difference between the two actions. Any recovery from a derivative suit is put into the
corporate treasury for the benefit of the whole community of corporate interests. H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 358. The Supreme Court recently re-emphasized
that rules governing derivative suits apply only to actions which the corporation itself
could bring. In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984), the Court considered an action brought by an investment company shareholder for breach of a fiduciary
duty owed to the company under the Investment Company Act. Because the Act did not
provide for such a corporate cause of action, the Court held that the shareholder was not
required to make a demand on the company's directors to institute a suit before corn-
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Not surprisingly, many derivative suits are brought against
directors5 or controlling shareholders6 who have allegedly injured their corporations and who, out of self-interest, fail to
bring the resulting corporate claims.7 The derivative suit has
thus rightly been called a "needed policeman"" and hailed as the
most efficient mechanism to hold officers and directors to proper
standards of corporate governance.'
A potential for misuse is, however, inherent in the derivative suit mechanism. Plaintiff-shareholders or their attorneys
may seek to enrich themselves rather than to redress corporate
wrongs.Y° To guard against such "strike suits," lawmakers have

mencing his own action. Id. at 842.
5. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd sub noma., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.
1981). See also infra notes 60-65, 78-83 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). See also infra notes 117-36
and accompanying text.
7. One authority states that, "The need for the derivative remedy is best illustrated
when those in control of the corporation are the alleged wrongdoers, for they can compound their wrong by preventing an action by the corporation against themselves." H.
HENN

& J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 358.

8. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 78 (1967)(extrapolated the designation of "needed policeman" from Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp.
522 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)). In Brendle the court commented that,
Despite the numerous abuses which have developed in connection with
such [derivative] suits, they have accomplished much in policing the corporate
system especially in protecting corporate ownership as against corporate management. They have educated corporate directors in the principles of fiduciary
responsibility and undivided loyalty. They have encouraged faith in the wisdom of full disclosure to stockholders. They have discouraged membership on
boards by persons not truly interested in the corporation .... The measure of
effectiveness of the stockholder's derivative suit cannot be taken by a computation of the money recovery in the litigated cases. The minatory effect of such
actions has undoubtedly prevented diversion of large amounts from stockholders to managements and outsiders. Corporate attorneys now have an arsenal of
authorities to support their cautioning advice to clients who may be disposed
to risk evasion of the high standard the courts have imposed upon directors.
Id. at 525-26.
Judge Wyzanski expressed similar ideas in Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D.
Mass. 1951): "[I]t is recognized that while minority corporate members are often activated by selfish interests, they are sometimes useful gadflies which become the most
effective instruments for ferreting out wrongdoing, for pursuing it publicly and for giving
point to the only sanctions actual and potential wrongdoers fear." Id. at 346.
9. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)(the
Court termed the derivative suit the "chief regulator of corporate management").
10. Franklin S. Wood conducted the most detailed and critical study of these abuses
for the Special Committee on Corporate Litigation of the Chamber of Commerce of the
State of New York. In 1944 that special committee published the study under the title
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imposed preliminary requirements such as security-for-expense
statutes" and the contemporaneous ownership rule.2 Neither of
these requirements, however, has proven to be an insurmountable barrier to derivative actions.1 3 A more persistent threat to
the derivative action is the so-called "demand requirement,"
which is typically accompanied by the companion issue of shareholder standing to sue.
Management, as one would expect, does not favor derivative
suits and maintains that derivative suits are both a nuisance to
efficient business operations 4 and an usurpation of the directors' rightful authority to run the affairs of the corporation, specifically its litigation. 5 As early as 1881, the United States Su6
preme Court, in Hawes v. City of Oakland,1
bowed to
management's formal corporate authority by preconditioning
shareholders' rights to sue upon the exhaustion of internal cor17
porate remedies.
In Hawes, the Court required the shareholders to allege in

Survey and Report Regarding Stockholders' Derivative Suits. One author has questioned the objectivity of this "Wood Report." Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 126 (1944).
11. The first such statute was enacted by New York in 1944 in reaction to the Wood
Report. This statute provides that a corporation upon whose behalf a derivative suit is
brought may require a plaintiff who owns less than five percent of any class of its outstanding shares, and whose shares are valued at less than $50,000, "to give security for
reasonable expenses including attorney's fees." N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 627 (McKinney
1983). Similar enactments of other states are aptly summarized in Dykstra, supra note 8,
at 88-94.
12. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (requiring that plaintiffs in a derivative suit must
allege, in a verified complaint, that they were shareholders at the time of the transaction
of which they complain or that their shares thereafter devolved to them by operation of
law). See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 362 for a more elaborate discussion
of this requirement.
13. See Dykstra, supra note 8, at 88-97; Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 261 nn.
3-4 (security-for-expense statutes); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 362 (contemporaneous ownership rule), § 372 (security-for-expense statutes).
14. See Byers v. Baxter, 69 A.D.2d 343, 419 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1979). In Byers the court
agreed with the board of directors that disruption of the corporation's business and large
expenses are justifiable reasons for deciding not to press claims against officers and directors. Id. at 347, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
15. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Gall is an early
case approving the use of special litigation committees to dismiss derivative actions. In
Gall, the court commented that "the decision of corporate directors whether or not to
assert a cause of action held by the corporation rests within the sound business judgment
of the management." Id. at 515.
16. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
17. Id. at 460-61.
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their complaint either that they had made a demand upon the
board to sue which had been refused or that such a demand
would have been futile."' The court discussed the theoretical underpinnings of corporate power and charged that a plaintiff
must demonstrate, "if he fails with the directors, that he has
made an honest effort to obtain action by the shareholders...
and he must show a case, if this is not done, .

. .

[that] it was

not reasonable to require it."' 9
Shareholder demand, however, is not an absolute prerequisite to bringing a derivative suit, as the Court in Hawes acknowledged by the almost advisory tone of its language.20 Courts
which apply state law on the question of shareholder demand
have further eroded that requirement when federal jurisdiction
is predicated on diversity of citizenship.21 Certain states have no
such requirement2 2 and many others require it only when the
alleged wrong is ratifiable by the shareholders,23 which is not the
case with two of the most common claims in derivative actions,

18. Id. at 461.
19. Id.
20. In line with that interpretation, demand on shareholders has often been excused,
especially when it is found to be unreasonable. One commentator noted that:
At one time or another, all of the following facts have been said to provide an
excuse [for demand on shareholders]: that there would be delay involved in
making a demand and awaiting a response to it; that a majority of the shareholders are, or are controlled by, the alleged wrongdoers; that the stock is diversely held; that the alleged wrong is not ratifiable; that there has already
been a purported ratification; and that the demand is prohibitively expensive.
Note, Demand on Directorsand Shareholders as a Prerequisiteto a Derivative Suit, 73
HARv. L. REV. 746, 754 (1960). But see Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass.
1951), where the court stated that,
The mere fact that a corporation is a large one with scattered members to
whom it would be expensive to send proxies and whose support it would be
difficult to command even in a just cause has not been recognized in Massachusetts as a ground for not resorting to the body of the members.
Id. at 344.
21. See, e.g., Dopp v. American Electronic Laboratories, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 151, 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D.Conn. 1950).
22. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
626(c)(McKinney 1963).
23. See, e.g., Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (1958); Continental
Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912). One commentator stated that
the reason for the demand requirement in this situation is that "a demand presumes
that shareholders are able to take remedial measures: Where shareholders have no power
to ratify actions, no purpose is served by requiring demand." Note, The Demand and
Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHL L. REV. 168, 183
(1976).
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fraud 24 and illegality.25 Shareholders in those two types of ac-

tions therefore are not required to make a prior demand on the
other shareholders.26
Because other commentators have thoroughly explored the
requirement of shareholder demand,2 7 this Article focuses on the
more troublesome questions presented by recent rulings which
flow from the holding in Hawes that a shareholder must initially
present a derivative claim to the board. As a predicate to that
discussion, this Article first examines the requirement of director demand itself and then discusses several cases dealing with
special litigation committees, a tactic directors have employed
recently to rid themselves of derivative suits. 28 These decisions

preceded and strongly influenced a recent line of cases dealing
with the requirement of director demand.
II.

THE REQUIREMENT OF DIRECTOR DEMAND

The Supreme Court in Hawes followed accepted maxims of
corporate governance by holding that shareholders ordinarily
must afford directors the initial opportunity to institute litigation on behalf of the corporation. As a collegial body, the directors of a corporation are its statutory managers. 29 Accordingly,
24. Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 300, 141 A.2d 458, 461-62 (1958); 13 W.
supra note 1, § 5795. Contra Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England
Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950). In Solomont, the court
held that a majority of disinterested stockholders may, in good faith, determine that a
cause of action for fraud against the directors shall not be enforced. Id. at 114, 93 N.E.2d
at 249.
25. Dopp v. American Electronic Laboratories, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 151, 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
26. The effect of the ratification theory therefore is to eviscerate the requirement of
shareholder demand. Note, supra note 23, at 183-84. But see Note, The Non-Ratification Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case for Limited JudicialReview, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1086 (1963).
27. Leavell, The Shareholders as Judges of Alleged Wrongs by Directors,35 TuL. L.
REv. 331 (1961); Stickells, Derivative Suits-The Requirement of Demand upon the
Stockholders, 33 B.U.L. REv. 435 (1953); Note, supra note 23. See also H. HENN & J.
FLETCHER,

ALEXANDER,

supra note 1, § 366.

28. See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 367; Steinberg, The Use
of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1980); Note, The Business Judgment Rule and the Litigation Committee: The End of a Clear Trend in CorporateLaw, 14 IND. L. REV. 617 (1981); Comment,
Offensive Applicationof the Business Judgment Rule to Terminate Nonfrivolous Derivative Actions: Should the Courts Guard the Guards?, 12 TEx. TECH L. REV. 635 (1981).
29. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)(1983); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
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the board of directors, and not the shareholders, should control
its litigation. 30 Because of their unique position of authority, directors are in the best position to evaluate whether the prosecution of a specific claim would serve the corporation's best interests.31 -Directors are able to employ the ample resources of the
business to litigate the claim and are in the best position to decide whether to settle the matter without suit, thus promoting
judicial economy.32 One commentator notes that,
This removal of the suit from the would-be plaintiff's exclusive
control has the additional effect of eliminating the danger of a
secret settlement between him and the alleged wrongdoers.
Moreover, the mere possibility of such removal discourages one
of the major abuses in the use of the derivative suit, namely,
its employment as a device to enable plaintiff's counsel to earn
substantial fees.33
Proffering demand is a relatively simple procedure if a
plaintiff makes "an earnest and sincere and not a feigned or simulated effort to induce the managing officers of the corporation
to take remedial action in its name."- 4 Mailing a copy of the
complaint to the board and demanding that it commence the

note 1, § 203.
30. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); Note, supra note 23, at 171. The Second Circuit remarked that
demand on directors is intended "to give the derivative corporation itself the opportunity to take over a suit which was brought on its behalf in the first place, and thus to
allow the directors the chance to occupy their normal status as conductors of the corporation's affairs." Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975)(per curiam).
31. See Brooks v. American Export Indus., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Abrams v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 361, 369 (N.D.IlM. 1974); Note, supra
note 23, at 171-72. Using a related approach, the Third Circuit reasoned that "the court,
in determining whether demand is necessary, should consider whether a demand on the
directors would be likely to prod them to correct a wrong." Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779,
786 (3d Cir. 1982).
32. Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1983).
33. Note, supra note 20, at 749. In theory, secret settlements of derivative suits are
no longer possible because Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now requires court approval of all such agreements. The requirement of director demand protects against a similar potential for abuse, namely, "strike suits." The Second Circuit
recently noted that "deference to directors' judgments may also result in the termination
of meritless actions brought solely for their settlement or harassment value." Lewis v.
Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983). See also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note

1, § 358.
34. Bartlett v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 221 Mass. 530, 537, 109 N.E. 452, 453
(1915).
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action will likely satisfy the requirement; the directors' failure to
respond within a reasonable time may be construed as a refusal
to sue.3 5 However, because "equity will not require. . . a useless
thing, '3 6 the demand requirement has never been absolute and
courts have excused it when demand would have been futile. For
example, when a majority of the board is either accused of active
misconduct 3 7 or under the obvious control of allegedly wrongdoing defendants, 3s some courts have permitted plaintiffs to dispense with the demand requirement.
A determination of futility, however, is not always easily
made. One commentator argues that a narrow standard should
be adopted which requires a demand unless the directors' interests are clearly antagonistic to the shareholders' claim.39 He
questions the inclination of courts to excuse demand when directors, although elected by an alleged wrongdoer, show some propensity to act independently. 40 This commentator argues that

35. See Tasner v. Billera, 379 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. IlM. 1974).
36. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. DeLoache, 297 F. Supp. 647, 654 (D.S.C. 1969).
37. See Untermeyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 580 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978);
Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1964); Cathedral Estates v.
Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955); Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167 (D.
Conn. 1950); Cohen v. Industrial Finance Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Parish
v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968); Dykstra,
supra note 8, at 98; Note, supra note 23, at 176; Note, supra note 20, at 753.
38. See Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., 625 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1980);
Abbe v. Goss, 411 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); McKee v. Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, 156 A.
191 (1931); Sohland v. Baker, 15 Del. Ch. 93, 141 A. 277 (1927); Note, supra note 20, at
753-54. The First Circuit defined "control" as an allegation of facts sufficient to show
that the board is incapable of dispassionately evaluating a claim on behalf of the corporation. In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 857 (1973).
39. Note, supra note 23, at 173-75. Two other commentators have proposed a standard which would excuse demand if a court determines that the directors are substantially implicated as defendants. "The extent to which the directors are 'substantially
implicated' may depend on the severity of the derivative claim and the extent to which
the directors are the principal defendants involved in the alleged wrongdoing." Frankel
& Barsky, The Power Struggle Between Shareholders and Directors:The Demand Requirement in Derivative Suits, 12 HoFsTRA L. REv. 39, 41 (1983).
40. Note, supra note 23, at 173-74. The author criticizes deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968)(a leading case which excuses demand in such
a situation), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). In deHaas, three members of a five
person board stated that they were not controlled by the alleged wrongdoer even though
they were elected by him, and professed that they would independently investigate the
shareholders' complaint and take appropriate action. 286 F. Supp. at 814. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling that demand was not required and noted that
"courts have generally been lenient in excusing demand." 435 F.2d at 1228.
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shareholders should be required to establish with specificity any
allegations that the41directors have a conflict of interest before
demand is excused.
When directors have not received profits from the questioned transaction, but have only passively approved it, the majority of courts have required demand.4 2 In these situations, it
may be appropriate to call the alleged mistakes of the directors
to their attention so that they may have an opportunity to correct them without litigation.43 Excusing demand automatically
when all the directors are named as defendants could encourage
sham pleadings that charge all directors with a breach of fiduciary duty for approving the questioned transaction. 4 Demand

41. Note, supra note 23, at 179-80. The psychological, economic, and sociological
ties, however, which typically bind independent directors to one another and the controlling corporate figure should be kept in mind in judging that situation. Eisenberg emphasizes that a substantial number of directorships are held by corporate executives and a
large number of the "outside" seats are filled by lawyers, investment bankers, or others
who are dependent on the corporation for business. Many, if not most, of the remaining
seats are held by individuals connected to the chief executive by friendship or former
colleagueship and even the directors not so bound to the chief executive officer tend to
be his nominees. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 145-48 (1976). Another commentator, however, expresses hope that the movement toward more independent boards will ameliorate such "groupthink" tendencies and promote higher quality
corporate decisions. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science
and CorporateLaw, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5 (1981).
42. See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115, 124 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982), reh'g denied, 459
U.S. 1138 (1983); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 785 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1162 (1st Cir. 1977). Contra Zilker v. Klein, 510 F.
Supp. 1070, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(the court excused demand when, over the course of
many decisions, the board had acquiesced in objectionable corporate behavior). Other
cases excusing demand upon a showing that the board had merely approved the questioned transaction are: Papilsky v. Berndt, 59 F.R.D. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 503 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974); Liboff v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 121, 122 (5th Cir. 1971)(per curiam). Professor Buxbaum proposed a novel
approach to these situations in which directors are accused of only "actionable imprudence." To determine if demand would be futile, and thus excused, he would bring to
bear the standards developed to judge self-dealing between corporations and their directors. Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interests Statutes and the Need for a Demand on Directors
in Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1122 (1980).
43. Note, supra note 23, at 178-79. See also Note, supra note 20, at 753-54; Kim,
The Demand on DirectorsRequirement and the Business Judgment Rule in the Shareholder Derivative Suit: An Alternative Framework, 6 J. CORP. L. 511, 518-19 (1981)(the
author argues for strict application of the demand requirement, but would automatically
grant shareholders standing to sue regardless of the reasons for a board's refusal to bring

such a suit).
44. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1983); Note, supra note 23, at
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may be excused, however, when it may be logically inferred theit
the directors would oppose the suit,45 but one commentator has
argued that such allegations should be demonstrated by uncon4
troverted factual assertions. "
If director demand is not excused, it must of course be
made.47 If the board accepts the demand and effectively prose-cutes the action, the wrongdoer is pursued and the corporation's
rights are enforced. 48 This, however, is rarely the case. Usually
the directors refuse the demand and the shareholder, in the face
of the board's opposition, must establish his standing to proceed
with the action.' 9
A board of directors typically premises its argument against
shareholder standing on the business judgment rule, the supposition that a court should not interfere with the board's prerogative to run the affairs of a corporation. 50 The business judgment

179-80.
45. Nussbacher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976). In Nussbacher,the court excused demand because of the directors' prior opposition to a nearly identical suit. 518 F.2d at 878.
46. Note, supra note 23, at 180-81. The court in Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 70
(N.D. Ill. 1981) echoed similar sentiments in a factual situation which it distinguished
from Nussbacher."[E]xcept when demand obviously would be futile dissident shareholders are required to make a sincere effort to obtain relief from the corporation prior
to petitioning the court." Id. at 73.
47. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881); FED. R Civ. P. 23.1. Most
states also have this requirement. See, e.g., CAL.CORP. CODE § 800 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 626(c)(McKinney 1963). In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831
(1984), the Supreme Court left open the question whether Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure "itself, as a matter of federal procedure, makes demand on directors
the predicate to a proper derivative suit in federal court or whether any such obligation
must instead be found in applicable substantive law." 104 S. Ct. at 837 n.8.
48. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 365.
49. In Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957), the court reasoned, "It is
obvious that the requirement that a stockholder ... must first demand of the board of
directors that it cause such an action to be instituted, does not mean that the board's
refusal on demand to act, ipso facto, clears the way for a suit by the . . . stockholder ...... Id. at 858.
50. See Ash v. International Business Machines, Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966). The court in Ash ruled that a derivative suit may be
maintained
only if the stockholder shall allege and prove that the directors of the corporation are personally involved or interested in the alleged wrongdoing in a way
calculated to impair their exercise of business judgment on behalf of the corporation, or that their refusal to sue reflects bad faith or breach of trust in some
other way.
353 F.2d at 493.
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rule, however, arose as a defense to claims charging directors
with violations of their duty of care. 51 As one commentator cogently points out, "Technically, the rule would seem irrelevant
as to the effect that a refusal to sue has on a derivative suit,
since the derivative suit seeks neither to hold the directors liable
for their refusal to sue nor to compel the corporation to sue."52
Additionally, in the three seminal cases 3 often cited by
those who would deny standing to shareholders after demand refusals, the alleged malefactors were not corporate insiders.5 4
When shareholders allege self-dealing, however, courts have traditionally been more inclined to let the cases proceed, especially
when the board of directors acquiesced in some fashion in the
transaction.5 5
III.

THE SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEE

In the mid-1970s certain directors named as defendants in
existing derivative actions artfully began moving for dismissal
by invoking their managerial authority over corporate affairs.5 6

51. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.,
Citytrust v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 242. See
also infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. The Delaware Supreme Court has recently held that the business judgment rule will not protect from liability directors who
act to approve a merger without pertinent information. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985).
52. Dent, The Power of Directorsto Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death
of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 96, 101-02 (1980).
53. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold
Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903); United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper
Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
54. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Coffee and
Schwartz argue that in each of the three seminal cases, "The plaintiff shareholder wished
the corporation to sue an entirely separate and unaffiliated entity, and the board of directors was not subject to even a colorable conflict of interest in any of the cases." Coffee
& Schwartz, supra note 3, at 266.
55. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 270-71 (citing Fleishhacker v. Blum, 109
F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1940) and other cases to support that observation). In Fleishhacker,
the court held that the refusal by the board of directors of a bank to bring suit against
its president for receiving an improper bonus would not impair a derivative action by the
shareholders. 109 F.2d at 547-48. A commentator similarly argues that "if the alleged
wrongdoer is a director, officer, or other agent of the corporation it seems that a suit
against him should be permitted, since the high standards of fiduciary responsibility require that he be held directly accountable for his malfeasance even when the board
would protect him." Note, supra note 20, at 760.
56. See Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d
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The defendants would first set up a committee of their "disinterested" colleagues, other directors not named in the suit, to
determine whether maintenance of the action was advantageous
to the corporation. 57 The committee would engage counsel of impeccable repute, usually a retired judge. He would investigate
the allegations and report that the action should be terminated,
citing such factors as the suit's lack of merit and its cost to the
corporation in legal fees, adverse publicity, and the disruption of
business. The committee would then concur and present its recommendation to the full board, which would use the committee's report as grounds for a dismissal motion. After several
lower courts approved this approach as a valid and unprejudiced
exercise of the board's management authority, 58 the United
States Supreme Court implicitly condoned it in Burks v.
Lasker.59
In Burks, shareholders of a registered investment company 60
charged that some of their directors failed to adequately investigate the quality and safety of certain investments made on behalf of the company. The plaintiffs sued derivatively in federal
court alleging causes of action under two federal statutes, the
Investment Company Act 6 ' and the Investment Advisors Act,6 2
and under the common law. Independent directors on the investment company's special litigation committee concluded that
the litigation was not in the corporation's best interest and made
a motion for dismissal. The Supreme Court refused to hold that
the federal statutes foreclosed that motion. State corporate law,
the Court stated, determines when a board's business judgment
gives it authority to terminate a derivative suit unless the
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Gall v. Exxon, 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
57. The court in Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), held
that the special litigation committee could constitute a minority of the board. 404 F.

Supp. at 1179-80. In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), the committee consisted of only two directors and the court held that DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(c)(1983) empowered the committee of disinterested directors to act on behalf of the
full board. 430 A.2d at 786.
58. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gall v. Exxon, 418 F.

Supp. 508, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
59. 441 U.S. 471, 480-83 (1979).

60. Investment companies are defined at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1982). For a concise
general description of the Investment Company Act, see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 54-64 (1983).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-13(a)(3), 80a-35 (1982).

62. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982).
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board's decision is inconsistent with federal acts. 3 The Court
emphasized that state law is the source of corporate rights and
of directors' powers, and that the federal government plays only
4
a limiting, secondary role.1

Shortly after the Court in Burks accorded federal deference
to state laws which shape the powers of special litigation committees, an important state court addressed the issue and indicated that derivative suits exist only at the sufferance of a corporation's purportedly independent directors.6 5 In Auerbach v.
Bennett,66 a special report of the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosed a widespread program of illegal payments
made by certain directors of a large, publicly-held corporation.

7

The plaintiff alleged that the director defendants breached certain fiduciary duties to the corporation, and demanded an accounting for those transactions.
Following the customary pattern, the corporation's board of
directors set up a special litigation committee composed of three
directors who joined the board after the challenged payments
occurred. The board then granted the committee authority to
determine its position on the suit. When the committee found
that the suit was not in the corporation's best interest, it informed counsel, who moved for dismissal. The New York Court
of Appeals held that the committee's business judgment to terminate the suit should be respected unless the plaintiff could
demonstrate that the decision was not an honest exercise of independent discernment. 6 Absent such a showing, the New York

Courts would not review the board's decision. That substantive
determination, the court reasoned, involved weighing and balancing numerous business considerations best left to directors,

63. 441 U.S. at 486.
64. Id. at 478.
65. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 479 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
66. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
67. In the post-Watergate era, "questionable payments" from "off-book" accounts of
many corporations came to light. In 1976 the Securities and Exchange Commission re-

ported its efforts in policing those abuses to Congress. SENATE COMM.

ON

BANKING, Hous-

ING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS. 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON QUESTIONABLE
AND ILLEGAL PAYMENTS (Comm. Print 1976). This resulted in the passage of the Foreign

Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which outlawed those activities. See 15 U.S.C. §
78m(b)(1982); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)(1982).

68. 47 N.Y.2d at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
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The thrust of Auerbach met with some favor. Following
that decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the
wisdom of giving one shareholder the right to overrule the views
of a disinterested committee of directors charged with promoting the long range interests of a corporation. 0 Thus, some commentators noted that Auerbach would deter nonmeritorious derivative actions brought by "strike suit lawyers" hoping to extort
unfair settlements from innocent directors.7 1 In such situations

the corporations ultimately bear the cost of any recovery because corporations usually indemnify their directors. 72 It was
also noted that the burden of even a nonfrivolous law suit may
outweigh its benefits considering the resulting adverse publicity
and disruptive effects on a corporation's activities.73
Many commentators, however, perceived dangers in the apparent unbridled discretion which the court in Auerbach
granted special litigation committees. 74 The business judgment
rule was developed by courts as a protection for corporate managers charged with negligently carrying out the corporation's
business. In those situations, judges were understandably reluctant to second-guess commercial or industrial plans, made in
good faith, which later turned out to have unfavorable conse-

69. 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court held that

factors involving "the weighing and balancing of legal, ethical, commercial, promotional,
public relations, [and] fiscal" matters fall within the business judgment rule. Id.
70. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979)(applying California law), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). The court in Lewis agreed with the reasoning in Auerbach

that
the good faith exercise of business judgment by a special litigation committee
of disinterested directors is immune to attack by shareholders or the
courts.... To allow one shareholder to incapacitate an entire board of directors merely by leveling charges against them gives too much leverage to dissident shareholders. There is no reason to believe that a minority shareholder is
more likely to act in the best interest of the corporation than are directors who
are elected by a majority of the stockholders.
Id. at 783. The Auerbach decision was also followed in Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.

Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980)(applying Michigan law), and Roberts v. Alabama Power
Co., 404 So. 2d 629 (Ala. 1981).

71. Comment, supra note 28, at 654 (citing Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp.,
582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978)).
72. See Byers v. Baxter, 69 A.D.2d 343, 347, 419 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500 (1979).

73. Comment, supra note 28, at 654.
74. See generally Steinberg, supra note 28; Note, supra note 28.
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quences for the corporation.7 5 The court in Auerbach, however,
employed the business judgment rule, not as a defense to liability, but as an offensive weapon to override a shareholder's standing to sue, on the specious grounds that decisions about corporate litigation should be made only by the board.7
Critics of the special litigation committee process also view
it as a transparent device manipulated by management to escape
liabiIity.7 One lower court aptly identified the structural bias
inherent in the procedure and reasoned that "aggrieved shareholders, when suing their directors for breach of fiduciary duty,
are entitled to receive judgment from an impartial tribunal
rather than from a committee appointed by the alleged
wrongdoers. "78
Two important courts did not share Auerbach's uncritical
acceptance of special litigation committees. In Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado,9 the Delaware Supreme Court forthrightly acknowledged the danger of a subtle bias in the process and
sought to cure it by authorizing substantive judicial review of
the committee's decisions. Zapata involved a derivative action
against a number of corporate officers and directors for breach
of fiduciary duties. The defendants formed an "Independent Investigation Committee," composed of two new outside directors,
to review the pending action 0 After following the typical investigative scenario, the committee concluded that the suit was inimical to the corporation's best interest and moved for dismis-

75. One New York court stated that, "The law will not interfere with the internal
affairs of a corporation so long as it is managed by directors pursuant to a free, honest
exercise of judgment uninfluenced by personal, or by any considerations other than the
welfare of the corporation." Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (1944). See also N. LATTIN,
LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS § 78 (2d ed. 1971)(discussing liability of directors for failure to
use due care); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1039.
76. 47 N.Y.2d at 632, 393 N.E.2d at 1000-01, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927-28. The court thus
permitted use of the business judgment rule as much more than a defense to liability.
77. One article pointed out that, "As a practical consequence of this extension of the
business judgment rule, a veto power over derivative actions may now rest with a corporation's often only nominally independent directors." Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 3,
at 262.
78. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd sub nom.,
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
79. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), rev'g Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch.
1980).
80. 430 A.2d at 781.
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sal. 81 The Delaware Supreme Court framed the issue squarely:
"When, if at all, should an authorized board committee be permitted to cause litigation, properly initiated by the derivative
8' 2
stockholder in his own right, to be dismissed?
The court in Zapata acknowledged the right of a properly
constituted committee of the board to superintend such corporate matters as litigation, but recognized that the unchecked exercise of such power could destroy the effectiveness of derivative
suits in policing corporate governance. The Zapata court therefore found it desirable "to find a balancing point where bona
fide stockholder power to bring corporate causes of action cannot be unfairly trampled on by the board of directors, but the
8' 3
corporation can rid itself of detrimental litigation.
The Zapata court found that an Auerbach review, limited
to determining the committee's honesty and independence,
would not strike the correct balance because of a natural" 'there
but for the grace of God go I' empathy" between the committee
members and their codirectors, the defendants. 4 The Zapata
court therefore authorized a second aspect of judicial review
over the committee's actions by permitting the Chancellor to resort to his own independent business judgment in determining
whether to grant the committee's dismissal motion. Analogizing
its decision to the judicial approval of the fairness of a settlement, the Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning
in Auerbach and held that a judge was competent to make such
a determination and could effectively evaluate the "'ethical,
commercial, promotional, public relations, employee relations,
fiscal [and] . . .legal'" factors involved. 5
In establishing this substantive review process, the court in
Zapata also implicitly acknowledged that more than monetary
benefit was at stake. It authorized the Chancellor to "give special consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition
to the corporation's best interests."88 In addition, the court in
Zapata went further than the court in Auerbach in the first step

81. Id.
82. Id. at 785.
83. Id. at 787.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 788.
86. Id. at 789. For a recent decision in which a special litigation committee met its
Zapata burdens, see Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984).
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of its review process by putting the burden on the committee to
establish its independence and good faith and allowing the
87
Chancellor to order limited discovery to probe those matters.
In an important subsequent case, Joy v. North,8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit8 9 found that
Connecticut, which had no statute or precedent on point,9°
would follow Zapata rather than Auerbach.9 1 In a lucid description of the business judgment rule, the court in Joy, out of both
a sincere reluctance to reverse commercial decisions and a fear
of fostering overly cautious business planning, found merit in judicial deference to the mercantile decisions of corporate management. Only when corporate action obviously lacked justification
would the court find the decision-makers liable for failing to use
due care. e2 On the other hand, the Second Circuit viewed the
business judgment employed by special litigation committees
differently because
special litigation committees created to evaluate the merits of
certain litigation are appointed by defendants to that litigation. It is not cynical to expect that such committees will tend
to view derivative actions against other directors with skepticism. Indeed, if the involved directors expected any result
other than a recommendation of termination at least as to
93
them, they would probably never establish the committee.
The Second Circuit therefore rejected the pure application of
the business judgment rule to special litigation committees and
adopted Delaware's two-step review process. The Second Circuit
disagreed with the court in Auerbach concerning the ability of

87. 430 A.2d at 788.
88. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub noma., Citytrust v. Joy, 460 U.S.

1051 (1983).
89. Federal jurisdiction in Joy was based on diversity of citizenship as provided by
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
90. The court in Joy, having jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship of the
parties, anticipated and applied the substantive law of the state in which it sat. See Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 80 (1938).
91. Joy, 692 F.2d at 888-89. Also following Zapata was Abella v. Universal Leaf
Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982)(applying Virginia law). See also Hasan v.
Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984), which looked to both Auerbach
and Zapata in holding that a special litigation committee recommending dismissal did
not establish the good faith and thoroughness of its investigation.
92. Id. at 885.
93. Id. at 888.
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judges to discern corporate benefit from particular litigation and
analogized such court review to "a lawyer's determining what a
case is 'worth' for purposes of settlement. '94 Interestingly, the
Second Circuit's settlement calculus expressly excludes consideration of certain potential indirect costs of derivative law suits.
The court's analysis omits consideration of the "negative impact
on morale and upon the corporate image" because such effects
are quite often related to the degree of wrongdoing, "a spectacular fraud being generally more newsworthy and damaging to morale than a mistake in judgment as to the strength of consumer
demand."9 5
In 1983, the Iowa Supreme Court went beyond Zapata and
Joy and rejected entirely the power of director-defendants to
delegate litigation authority in derivative lawsuits to special litigation committees."' The court suggested as an alternative that
directors could apply to the court for the appointment of a "special panel," which would be empowered to make such decisions.97 Although these judicial rulings have curbed management's power to terminate derivative suits by use of special
litigation committees, more stringent constructions of the demand requirement now pose an even graver threat to the ability
of shareholders to champion those actions.

IV.

RECENT CASES ON DIRECTOR DEMAND

Several recent cases indicate that courts may be reluctant to
excuse demand in all but the most obviously futile situations
and may uncritically respect the refusals of boards to bring the
actions by denying the shareholders standing to sue. If such a
trend prevails, the derivative suit, so recently saved from the
machinations of special litigation committees, will fall prey to
another artful triumph of legal form over sociological reality.
8 one of the important postIn Abramowitz v. Posner,"
Zapata cases from the Second Circuit, the plaintiff shareholder

94. Id. at 892.
95. Id.
96. Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals followed Miller in Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App.
537, 324 S.E.2d 878 (1985).
97. 336 N.W.2d at 718.
98. 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982).
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commenced a derivative action against five of seventeen directors for fraud and misappropriation of corporate assets. The
plaintiff alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"" Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and
the common law. By the time the plaintiff brought suit, the defendants had repaid substantial amounts of the allegedly converted corporate funds pursuant to both an SEC consent decree
and the report of a special audit committee established through
the SEC proceeding.
The plaintiff originally made no demand on the board, alleging in her complaint that it would have been futile. 100 The
trial court disagreed and dismissed the action with leave to replead. 101 The plaintiff then made demand, and when the board
refused, pursued her claim nonetheless. The trial court again
dismissed the suit and ruled that, absent a showing of bad faith,
a derivative action could not be maintained in opposition to the
board's decision that the suit was not in the best interest of the
02

corporation.1

Applying Delaware law, the Second Circuit recognized that
the reasoning in Zapata provided for substantive judicial review
of a special litigation committee's determination not to continue
a derivative action. 03 It declined, however, to apply such a standard in examining a board's refusal to sue in response to a
shareholder's demand.10 4 The court emphasized that, in such a
situation, only the independence and good faith of the directors
would be scrutinized, 05 not the merits of their decision. The
Second Circuit also reasoned that the federal securities laws did
not require a Zapata-like review of a board of directors' refusal
to bring suit because "the policies underlying Section 10(b) are
not offended by [adhering to] the business judgment rule ...
when a corporation's disinterested directors, independently and
in good faith, determine that the action is not in the company's
best interest." 0 6

99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982).
100. 672 F.2d at 1028.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1029.
103. Id. at 1030-31.
104. Id. at 1031.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1032.
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The court in Abramowitz also declined to treat the plaintiff's situation as the functional equivalent of demand futility,
which would have arguably necessitated a Zapata review.1"7 Because only five of the corporation's seventeen directors were defendants, and the board had cooperated in the SEC's action, the
Second Circuit found "it far from 'inevitable' that [the plaintiff's] demand would [have been] refused."' 10 8
One year later, in Lewis v. Graves,109 the Second Circuit
again enunciated strict guidelines for when demand would be excused. In Lewis, the plaintiff challenged a highly publicized
merger and the issuance of stock to certain officers and directors. All the directors named in the complaint approved both
corporate actions, and the plaintiff claimed that the approval
was sufficient involvement to make a demand futile and therefore excused. 110
The court in Lewis, however, rejected the plaintiff's claim,
and held that neither naming all the directors as defendants nor
questioning transactions which the directors approved was sufficient to render demand futile.'' Instead, the court held that a
plaintiff must plead particularized allegations of bias or selfdealing by the defendant directors to demonstrate their inability
to fairly consider a demand for suit." 2 Despite their earlier approval, directors might still bring suit when their consent was
obtained by fraud or when the dealings in question later turned
out to be unprofitable for the corporation." l3 The court reasoned
that to excuse demand merely because all directors were named
as defendants would condone an easy ploy to eviscerate the demand requirement." 4
In Lewis, the plaintiff alleged that only five of the eleven
directors on the board at the time of the complaint received
tainted stock. A majority of directors was therefore free, the
court stated, to rule on the proposed suit although the board

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1033.
Id.
701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248-49.

Id.
Id. at 248.

Id.
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had authorized the stock issuance in question.115 With respect to
the challenged merger, the court found no facts alleged which
indicated that the defendant directors arranged the merger to
entrench their own positions. The court therefore held that the
plaintiff's showing of bias was not sufficient to disqualify the 11di6
rectors from examining the proposed action before its filing.
In 1984, the Delaware Supreme Court decided two important director demand cases. In Aronson v. Lewis,"" a shareholder brought a derivative action alleging that the board authorized payment of unearned fees and benefits to a director
who owned 47% of the corporation's outstanding stock. The
plaintiff named all of the corporation's directors as defendants
and did not make demand because the board approved the consulting agreement which generated the fees and benefits, and because the shareholder who profited from the agreement allegedly
selected the board. 1s The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to make demand or "to allege with factual particularity why demand [should have been] excused.""' 9
The issue confronting the court in Aronson was whether the
allegations of the complaint indicated that the board could not
have impartially considered and acted upon the proposed suit,
thus making demand futile. 20 In the lower court, the ViceChancellor found that the underlying transactions supported a
"reasonable inference" that the directors who had approved the
transaction might be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty and
thus could not fairly consider the demand.' 2 ' The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss and granted the shareholder
standing to sue. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, focusing
its analysis more sharply on the business judgment rule. When

115. Id. at 249-50.
116. Id. Judge Friendly commented that the court in Lewis might have reached the
opposite conclusion had the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant-directors were opposing a hostile tender offer. Kaster v. Modification Systems,
Inc., 731 F.2d 1014, 1023 (2d Cir. 1984)(Friendly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
117. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
118. Id. at 809.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 807. The Delaware Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: "[W]hen
is a stockholder's demand upon a board of directors, to redress an alleged wrong to the
corporation, excused as futile prior to the filing of a derivative suit?" Id.
121. Id. at 808.
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directors are disinterested and fully informed on a question of
business policy, the court reasoned that judicial deference to
acts of corporate management is warranted.122 The court acknowledged that in Zapata, a factually similar case, it had restricted its interpretation of the business judgment rule,123 but
emphasized that the decision in Zapata addressed special litigation committees and the continuation of litigation, not the ex1 24
cusing of demand.

The court in Aronson then established a two-pronged test
to determine when demand would be excused."25 The threshold
question is whether the defendants are "interested" in the transaction; if the directors are found to be "interested," they cannot
1 26
be expected to scrutinize the transaction with independence.
In such a situation, the court found that demand should be excused. Showing that the directors have merely approved a transaction, however, will not make out such a case unless the transaction is so egregious on its face that the approval cannot meet
any test of business judgment. 2 7 If directors pass this initial test
of independence, the substantive nature of the challenged transaction must then be examined, in light of the allegations in the
complaint, to see if the board is protected by the business judgment rule:"2 s
In sum the entire review is factual in nature. The Court of
Chancery in the exercise of its sound discretion must be satisfied that a plaintiff has alleged facts with particularity which,
taken as true, support a reasonable doubt that the challenged
transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment. Only in that context is demand excused. 12 9
Applying this standard to the facts, the court in Aronson
found that the board's business judgment was not so obviously
tainted that demand would have been futile.130 The court rea122. Id. at 814-15.
123. Id. at 813.
124. The court noted that the issue in Aronson, quoted supra note 120, was left
unanswered in Zapata. 473 A.2d at 807, 814.
125. 473 A.2d at 814.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 815.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 816.
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soned that neither the amount of voting stock owned by the director who benefited from the challenged consulting agreement
nor the mere allegation that he nominated or selected all the
other directors sufficiently demonstrated that he controlled the
board. 13 1 Particularized facts demonstrating such dominance
were needed to qualify those charges as a basis for excusing
demand. 132
The court in Aronson also held that the employment agreement did not appear on its face so obviously valueless to the
corporation that the court should question the directors' business judgment. 3 3 Although the plaintiff charged that the controlling shareholder performed "no or little services' 34 for his
large compensation package, the court found the charges to be
only "bare allegation[s].' 35 The court distinguished the facts at
bar from an earlier case of established corporate waste in which
an elderly stroke victim received large benefits pursuant
to a
36
consulting agreement which required nothing from him.
Within four months of its decision in Aronson, the Delaware
Supreme Court reapplied its rule to bar another derivative action because the plaintiffs failed to make a demand on the directors and could not demonstrate why it would have been futile.
In Pogostin v. Rice,' 37 plaintiff-shareholders named all fourteen
directors of their corporation as defendants and charged them
with wrongfully rejecting a tender offer. The plaintiffs also
claimed that the temporary increase in the market price of the
corporation's shares resulting from the tender offer caused excessive payments to four of the directors under an executive
compensation plan tied to the stock's market price. 8
The plaintiffs did not make a demand on the directors to
pursue those actions on behalf of the corporation, alleging that
such a request would have been ineffective because "'[e]ach of
the directors participated in the wrongs alleged, and each is lia-

131. Id.

132. Id.
133. Id. at 817.
134. Id. at 809.
135. Id. at 817.
136. Id. at 817-18 (distinguishing Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch.
262, 92 A.2d 311 (1952)).
137. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
138. Id. at 622.
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ble therefor' and 'the directors could not and would not sue
themselves.' -139 The court noted, however, that a special com-

mittee composed of outside directors, none of whom had a personal interest in the tender offer, made the initial recommendation to reject the bid upon the advice of disinterested financial
experts. 140 The court also observed that a majority of disinterested directors had approved the challenged compensation arrangement and the shareholders had ratified it many years
before the questioned payments. 14' The court, in addition, found
that tying executive remuneration to the "vagaries of the [stock]
42
1
market" was not unreasonable.

The Delaware Supreme Court then applied its two-step Aronson inquiry that a plaintiff, seeking to have demand excused,
must allege facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that "(1)
the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction otherwise was the product of a valid exercise
of business judgment."' 43 The court in Pogostin agreed with the
court in Aronson that questions of business judgment and the
standards used to substantively review director action are inex44
tricably mixed with the preliminary issue of demand futility.

This statement was perhaps a candid admission that the court
would use the threshold demand issue to prejudge sub silentio
the merits of a plaintiff's contentions.
The court in Pogostin also held that the plaintiff had not
asserted facts which, if proven, would reasonably call into question either the directors' independence or their business judgment. 4 5 The court therefore ruled with an air of finality that
"the plaintiffs' bootstrap allegations of futility, based on claims
of directorial participation in and liability for the wrongs alleged, coupled with a reluctance by directors to sue themselves,
46
were laid to rest in Aronson.'

The court in Aronson and Pogostin thus gave a narrow re-

139.
140.
141.
142.
(1959)).
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 623.
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id. (citing Lieberman v. Becker, 38 Del. Ch. 540, 544, 155 A.2d 596, 599-600
480 A.2d at 624 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814).
480 A.2d at 624-25.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 625.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss4/5

24

Morrissey: New Rulings Threaten the Derivative Suit -- Will the "Needed Poli

1985]

DERIVATIVE SUIT

655

sponse to Zapata's unanswered question concerning when the
court will excuse shareholder demand on directors as futile. The
anomaly which results from the rulings is that when demand is
excused, Zapata requires the court to substantively scrutinize a
board of director's control over litigation through purportedly
independent special committees.1 47 When, however, shareholders
cannot show that demand would be futile, they may have little
chance of successfully challenging a board's refusal to sue and
gaining standing to litigate the matter themselves. According to
the reasoning of Abramowitz, in "demand-refused" situations,
the court will grant shareholders standing to sue only when they
can impugn the honesty or independence of the board.1 48 A deferential application of the business judgment rule will thus truncate the judicial review of the merits of the plaintiffs' suit. Professor Dent notes, however, that plaintiffs faced with a demand
refusal have rarely challenged the board's action as unreasonable
and courts have therefore seldom ruled on such claims. 49 From
that observation, Dent concludes that the implication and scope
of the business judgment rule remain unsettled in the context of
refusals to sue. 150
Both a board's refusal to sue and a special litigation committee's motion to dismiss present similar potential for structural bias. A board in a situation similar to the one confronting
the court in Aronson is certainly no more independent than a
special litigation committee like the one in Zapata. The "'there
but for the grace of God go I' empathy"' 5' is as much present

147. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 785-89.
148. 672 F.2d at 1031-33.
149. Dent, supra note 52, at 103.
150. Id. In Zapata,430 A.2d at 784 n.10, the Delaware Supreme Court commented,
in dicta, that it would apply the business judgment rule to review demand refusals. One
commentary, therefore, sees Delaware, like New York, giving uncritical acceptance to the
decisions of boards to terminate derivative suits unless the directors are financially interested in the questioned transaction. Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits
Against Directors on Business Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1503, 1509 (1984). In Zapata, however, the Delaware Supreme Court described its
substantive review of the special litigation committee's motion to dismiss as an application of the business judgment rule, 430 A.2d at 784, and in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), it has recently held that the business judgment rule will not protect
directors from liability who act to approve a merger without pertinent information. The
degree of latitude, therefore, that the Delaware Supreme Court will accord directors in
"demand refused" situations remains an open question.
151. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787. Professor Cox puts the matter forcefully: "Structural
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with full boards in the "demand refused" scenarios as with the
special litigation committees in the "demand excused" cases. In
fact, the directors on the special litigation committees in Zapata
and Joy, appointed after the questioned transactions, were arguably more independent than the directors in Aronson and
Pogostin who had actually approved the challenged employment
agreement and compensation plan.
V.

CONCLUSION

The holdings in Aronson and Pogostin, standing alone, may
not trouble partisans of the derivative suit. Even though demand may appear to be a meaningless step, because directors
rarely champion suits proposed by shareholders, practical reasons may exist for requiring it in all but the most obviously futile situations. 152 The demand requirement frustrates legitimate
causes of action only when courts use a demand refusal to foreclose the shareholder's ability to bring a suit.
The decisions in Aronson and Pogostin indicate an inclination by the Delaware Supreme Court to require demand when it
appears, at the threshold, that derivative suits will not be successful. In setting forth its two-pronged standard, the court believed it was "strik[ing] the essential balance between avoiding
abuse of the derivative action and forcing a plaintiff to plead
evidence without the benefit of discovery."153 Those rulings,
however, should not be allowed to chill plaintiffs with meritorious actions from seeking standing to sue in their own right if
their demands are refused.
A review of the directors' decision not to sue under the business judgment rule must mean something more than only passing on the bona fides of the board. If the Delaware Supreme
Court in Zapata thought it necessary to subject the dismissal

bias may be easier to discern in the recommendation of a special litigation committee,
but is equally present, and equally problematic, when the directors refuse a demand for
suit or approve an out-of-court settlement." Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice
in Derivative Suit Litigation:A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DuKE L.J.
959, 1011.

152. See Kim, supra note 43, at 518-19. See also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text; Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors,65
CORNELL L. REv. 600, 631-32 (1980).
153. Pogostin,480 A.2d at 625.
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decisions of independent special litigation committees to a
judge's business judgment, there is even more reason for the
court not to give uncritical deference to the refusals by boards
themselves to bring such suits in the first place. A similar substantive review is warranted in both situations. Condoning the
approach taken by the Second Circuit in Abramowitz would revive the superficial review standards of Auerbach and permit derivative suits to be "snuffed out" even earlier than they would
be by special litigation committees. A few short years after surviving that endangerment, the derivative suit will again face extinction154 if such a judicial attitude prevails. 5

154. The descriptive metaphor is carried from Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d
Cir. 1982).
155. As this Article was being set in print, the American Law Institute published
the initial discussion draft of its Principlesof Corporate Governance:Analysis and Recommendations concerning the derivative action. In a position quite similar to the one
advocated in this Article, the ALI draft rejected the "demand required/demand excused"
distinction as "an overly crude instrument" to measure the quality of judicial scrutiny
needed over the decisions of directors to terminate derivative suits. In all such instances,
the ALI would have the court employ a Zapata-like review of the action's probable merit
and its likely impact on the corporation. American Law Institute, Principlesof Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Part VII, ch. 1, § 7.08 (discussion
draft no. 1, June 3, 1985).
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